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Abstract
This paper studies the relative geographic scope of two different channels of knowledge flows, a market
channel where knowledge diffuses via patent transactions and a non-market channel where knowledge
spillovers operate via patent citations. While there is significant work on informal non-market channels
of knowledge diffusion, formal market channels of knowledge transfer are less studied, primarily due to
the lack of comprehensive data. Using a newly compiled dataset by the Office of the Chief Economist at
the United States Patent and Trademark Office of transactions of US issued patents, we are able to provide
novel insights on the spread of patent transaction flows across the states of the US. Our findings support
that geographic proximity, in terms of distance and border, matters for the spread of knowledge for both
channels; however, it is more essential to the operation of market based (patent trades) than to the operation
of non-market based (citations) flows. Although both flows are highly localized, the geographic scope of
knowledge flows based on citations is larger than that of traded patents. Intra-sectoral flows are also found
to be very localized with Mechanical sector to exhibit the most geographically confined knowledge flows,
while flows from information technology sectors, i.e., Electronics and Computers, are the most far reached
compared to the knowledge flows from the rest of the sectors, both in the US and abroad. Finally, there is
no nuance evidence that the importance of distance has declined over time, either at state or national level
for both types of flows.
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1. Introduction
Generation of new technological knowledge lies at the heart of economic growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas,
1988). Technological inventions have become the most important source of growth, replacing land, energy,
and raw materials.1 Producing new knowledge, however, is not cheap and highly concentrated (Audretsch
and Feldman, 1996). One way to avoid replicating others’ ideas and improve the allocation of technology
in an economy is by generating tradable intellectual property rights, for example, patents. Specifically, the
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1During the last two decades, the value of patents and other intellectual property assets has surged to become a large part of the
wealth portfolio of firms today. In the early 1980’s intangible assets represented 38% of the portfolios of U.S. firms, while in the mid
1990’s and 2000’s this share rose to 70% (WIPO, 2004). "The economic product of the United States", as Alan Greenspan stated, has
become "predominantly conceptual" (Stanford Report, 2004). Intellectual property forms part of those conceptual assets.
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market of patents provides incentives to develop innovations (Spulber, 2008) - the inventor can simply sell
the patent to a specialized producer and shifts his efforts to a new invention - and reinforces the value of
current technology. For example, companies, such as Intel, spend considerable resources explicitly encour-
aging the external development of complementary technology (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). In addition
to their contribution in increasing the rate of innovation, patent transactions improve the geographic distri-
bution of technology. As knowledge production is concentrated in space, the market of patents facilitates
the stretch of a patented idea in space, as potential distant buyers may, too, purchase the innovation.
Moreover, patent transactions act as a channel of acquiring technological knowledge. The idea that
patents promote diffusion and creation of technology is not new and dates back to Arrow (1962). Transac-
tions involving technology packages (patents, patent licensing, and other intellectual property and know-
how) can entail knowledge exchange between transacted agents. In particular, buying a patent, is not just
buying a legal piece of paper. Businesses buy patents to use the technology covered by the patent, which
could be vital for their own line of knowledge or goods production. The willingness-to-pay of potential
buyer depends on the technological knowledge contained in the patent (Anton and Yao, 1994). In using a
patent, sometimes the buyer could develop connections with the seller in order to implement the patented
technology. Such contacts could also involve transferring the necessary ‘how-to’ knowledge to the firm,
which buys the patent. Consequently, technological learning could be inferred from patent transactions. 2
An important question, in this respect, is whether geographic factors shape the trade of patents and,
therefore, affect the allocation of technology across regions and accompanied technological flows. In a
globalized word, ideas generated in one place can travel to another very distant one, at an unprecedented
rate, via the Internet, phones and other means of communications and boundaries may play little role.
Counterarguments, however, suggest that geographic nearness still plays an important role and strongly
influences the diffusion of knowledge. Distance may still matter if face-to-face interactions are important,
even sometimes in high-tech sectors as knowledge is tacit and hard to codify. Further, more globalization
relates to more industry specialization and, therefore, less to learn from one another.
This paper aims to examine whether geographic nearness, state border and distance, shape the trade of
patented ideas and, consequently, knowledge flows exemplified by this formal market-based channel for
the US over the period 1995-2010. Using detailed and recently developed data on patent reassignments
of US-based entities, we explore whether the trade of ‘weightless’ ideas is confined by geographic factors
even within the same country and whether the importance of geography has changed over time due to
technological developments.
In general, the literature has documented the localization of market transactions and potential knowl-
edge diffusion generated. In particular, the trade-growth literature infers learning by analyzing trade flows
(Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 2002) between industries and countries. According to this literature, im-
porting a foreign intermediate good allows a recipient country to learn from the R&D-, or ‘technology’-
content embodied in the traded good and merchandise trade acts as an important conduit of market-based
knowledge flows across industries and countries. A separate strand of literature, documents evidence of
knowledge flows via the mobility of highly skilled personnel, the inventors of patents (Marx et al., 2009).
Embodied knowledge in inventors can be spread out via face-to-face interaction between talented individ-
uals (Arrow, 1962). These two channels of knowledge flows generated either via the trade of goods and
mobility of innovators involve movements of goods and people, respectively. Consequently, geography
could still pertain a nuance role and this is indeed what both strands document. Despite the significant
decrease in transportation costs and development of communication technology, distance has not decayed
in importance (Disdier and Head, 2008).
However, knowledge flows can be also generated via non-market mechanisms. Undoubtedly, one of
the most important contributions in the past twenty years in measuring knowledge spillovers is the work
of Jaffe et al. (1993), which introduces patent citations as a metric for knowledge spillovers. Since then,
studies have shown that geographic proximity significantly affects both intra-national and international
2A recent study by Serrano (2011) shows that the transfer of patents has become an important source of adopting technology for
US firms. The study develops and estimates models of costly technology transfer and renewal in the market for innovation and
quantifies possible gains from trading patents as well as costs of adopting technology in the market for patents.
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knowledge spillovers (Thompson, 2006; Aldieri, 2011) and such knowledge flows increase innovation out-
put of nearby regions (Peri, 2005). With respect to the significance of geography over time in knowledge
diffusion, evidence from the patent-citation literature is rather mixed.3 For instance, Thompson (2006) finds
that intra-national knowledge flows in the US have become less localized, while international knowledge
flows have remained constant. The studies of Griffith et al. (2011) and Aldieri (2011), on the other hand,
provide support that there is a fall in the national home bias for patent citations; nonetheless, the overall
home bias effect is still significant in comparison with the decrease observed in recent years.
Despite the importance of patents in economic growth and welfare, there is scant evidence so far on the
impact of geography on patent trades and potential formal knowledge flows generated, primarily due to
lack of comprehensive data. To our knowledge, there are two studies that undertake such investigation. A
recently published study by Burhop and Wolf (2013) documents historical evidence on geographic effects
of patent transactions to also infer knowledge diffusion across German regions during 1884-1913. An in-
vestigation of patent licenses, as opposed to patent transfers, as a potential channel of knowledge flows,
and whether geography shapes the latter, is performed by Mowery and Ziedonis (2001). The authors find
that formal knowledge flows, operating by academic licensing, are more bounded by geographic distance
compared to informal flows exemplified by patent citations. However, as the authors state, their sample is
small, consisting only of four US universities, and focuses only on academic patents.
This paper contributes to the aforementioned emerging literature by adding novel insights on how
geography shapes the trade of patents and formal knowledge flows generated by this type of trade. The
empirical investigation of the reach of traded patented ideas, both at aggregate and sectoral level, in the
US - one of the most innovative countries in the world - consists the first attempt in the literature. To get
a sense of our estimates, we also examine the geographic reach of patent citation flows, and contrast the
findings.
At the outset of our paper we would like to note that patent trade flows, as a measure of knowledge
flows, is susceptible to criticisms also applied to other measures of knowledge flows namely patent ci-
tations, trade of goods, and inventors’ mobility as to whether they capture ‘actual’ knowledge flows or
noise, too.4 Firms can also buy patents for defensive reasons - to help defend the patents the company
already owns by acquiring similar technology. Consequently, patent trades could proxy more things than
knowledge flows between buyer and seller. To capture actual knowledge transmitted between involved
agents, one could, for instance, employ the citations a patent receives from the perspective buyer before
the transaction, i.e., firms that acquire a patent could also previously cite the patent. The size and nature
(e.g., start-up firms, established) of a firm could also be relevant, as small-sized firms tend to buy patents
for technology purposes, while large ones for strategic reasons. Unfolding, however, the reason behind
the patent transaction, i.e., whether it is pure strategy or knowledge acquisition, has not been easy thus
far, due to data unavailability and still unmatched databases. The use of patent licenses, instead of patent
trades, could provide an alternative more appropriate proxy of knowledge exchange due to the frequency
of contacts between the patent licensor and licensee. Patent licensing data are, however, proprietary and
constructed via surveys for a limited number of firms or US universities (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2001). Fi-
nally, patent trades, as a metric of knowledge flows, capture a sub-set of knowledge diffusion - the patented
knowledge - ignoring, for instance, knowledge, which is not patentable.
Our empirical analysis is developed around two key questions: First, to what extent do we observe
similar localization in patent transfers as in the well-documented case of patent citations? Second, does the
significance of geographic factors for patent transactions change over time?
Our empirical analysis proceeds as follows: We estimate a gravity-like equation in order to assess the
role of nearness on patent transactions. To elaborate more on our findings we provide evidence from state
level and sector level analysis, performing a number of robustness tests. To examine whether border and
distance have declined or still persisting over time, the econometric specifications account for an early time
period (1995-2002) and a recent time period (2003-2010) and examine the differences. Lastly, to get a sense
3For an excellent and up-to-date review of knowledge flows and geography see Autant-Bernard et al. (2013).
4See for a discussion the study of Criscuolo and Verspagen (2008).
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of the size of our patent trade estimates, we also examine time and geographic effects on citation flows and
contrast the evidence.
Our results clearly support strong localization of patent transaction flows as states tend to involve more
in exchanging patents and citations within their borders than with other states or countries, but there is
no nuance evidence, however, for higher significance of nearness over time. Citation flows also appear to
be less geographically confined than patent transaction flows and eventually knowledge flows based on
citations exchange are more far stretched in space than their counterparts based on patent trade. This is
quite apparent, especially, when it comes to very large distances in the US, for instance, exchange of patents
or citations between East and West Coast. While distance is a strong hurdle for both flows, its effect is more
dramatic on patent transactions. Sector level analysis of patent transaction and citation flows confirms state
level findings. Intra-sectoral flows are also found to be very localized with Mechanical sector to exhibit
the most geographically confined knowledge flows, while flows in information technology sectors, i.e.,
Electronics and Computers, are the most far reached compared to the knowledge flows from the rest of the
sectors, both in the US and abroad. We also explore the role of agglomeration in shaping the geographic
localization of patent trade. Our resultss do not support a strong evidence between agglomeration and
trade of ideas across space and time.
The implications of our findings for the growth literature are potentially relevant. Although theoretical
studies (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991) emphasize the important consequences of disembodied knowledge
flows over knowledge embodied, there has been little effort, on the empirical side, to explore all mecha-
nisms of disembodied knowledge diffusion. Along with other important studies, this paper makes an
effort towards analyzing disembodied knowledge diffusion via the channel of patent trades, complement-
ing, thus, important contributions in the field of disembodied knowledge diffusion.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework of our analysis
and discusses the data. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 summarizes our findings and concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. Model Specification
We use a simple gravity-like equation, proposed and used in the trade literature (Krugman, 1991) and
economics of innovation and spillover literature (Peri, 2005), to model bilateral patent transaction flows as
a function of geographic and time factors:
τijt = β0 + β1State Borderij + β2Nearby States [500 miles]ij+
β3Distance [500− 1, 500 miles]ij + β4Distance [> 1500 miles]ij+
β5OutO f Countryir + β6Dummyijt + β7Zijt + eij
(1)
where τijt is patent transaction flows between two states i (destination) and state j (origin); State Border
takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that share a common border and 0 other-
wise; Nearby States [500 miles] takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states that do not share
a common border and their geographical centers are located within a distance of 500 miles, and 0 other-
wise; Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] is a distance class of 500 to 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows
exchanged between states i and j that are located within 500 to 1,500 miles, and 0 otherwise; Distance [>
1, 500 miles] is a distance class of larger than 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged be-
tween states i and j that are located in a distance larger than 1,500 miles and 0 otherwise; OutO f Country
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if states involve in international patent trade and 0 if they do not;
Dummy is a time dummy variable which takes the value of 0 if a patent is traded in the period 1995-2002
and 1 if it is traded in the period 2003-2010; the vector Z contains time and distance interaction terms, and
e is an iid error term.
The coefficients β1 till β5 provide a characterization of how pure geographic factors shape the flows of
patent trade. By model construction, each geographic coefficient captures the difference between knowl-
edge flows diffused in geographic space to knowledge flows within a state. Consequently, the coefficient
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of the first dummy, State Border, captures how much patent transaction and possible knowledge exchange
takes places between states that share a common state border compared to in-state level of exchange. Irre-
spective of the border effect, the second dummy, Nearby States [500 miles], captures the differences in patent
trade exchanged between states located in a distance of 500 miles compared to in-state transactions. The
coefficients of the (rest of the) distance dummies, examine whether states that have been located in various
distance classes exhibit different patent trade interactions in comparison to in-state level of interactions.
We opted for this distance taxonomy because the longest distance in miles between two neighboring states
is approximately 500 (517,705 miles to be precise), which is the distance between the centers of Colorado
and Oklahoma. Then, we proceed with batches of 1,000 miles till the distance between East and West Coast
is exhausted. In addition, the coefficient of OutO f Country allows to explore international aspects of patent
trade transactions. It captures the difference in patent trade of state i that has with the rest of the world
(denoted as ‘region’ r) compared to in-state transactions. One would expect that larger geographic distance
would reduce exchange of patents and consequently knowledge flows across the states due to the presence
of spatial transaction and other information costs, signaling that knowledge flows are bounded in space
and characterized by spatial declining effect. Strong localization effects occur when almost all patent trade
activity takes place in-state rather than across states (or abroad).5
Further, the time dummy, Dummy captures whether more recent trade is more (or less) localized than
earlier one. If the role of nearness declines over time, then one would expect for β6 to be negative and
statistically significant. Lastly, to explore time patterns of nearness and international patent transactions,
we also include time-distance interaction terms, in the vector Z. If their coefficients are negative and sta-
tistically significant, then this would be an indication of possibly higher significance of distance over time,
i.e., strong "still persisting" distance effect.
2.2. Estimation Technique
Patents and citations are ’count data’ - and some states record zero information on either patents or
citations. To handle this type of data, we use a generalization of the Poisson model, known as negative
binomial estimator, which is frequently used in similar to ours contexts (Peri, 2005; Perkins and Neumayer,
2011; Furman and Stern, 2011) and does not rely on the restrictive assumption that the conditional means
to be equal the conditional variances, as Poisson does.6 Another advantage of using negative binomial its
ability to accommodate ’zero’ outcomes of the dependent variable.
To assess the geographic and time effects on patent transaction flows across states of the US, we estimate
equation (1) for different sub-samples and alternative definitions of patent transaction flows, i.e., τijt in
equation (1) could be either all flows, or first flow or last flow of patent transactions or even citation flows
in order to compare our evidence of patent transactions with that of patent-citation literature.
2.3. Data Description and Analysis
Our empirical analysis is based on 50 states of the US for the period 1995 to 2010.
The primary source of patent data is a recently compiled dataset by the office of the chief economist of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), kindly provided to us, referred as Patent Assign-
ment Dataset, which contains assignments (transactions) of US issued patents between entities registered at
the USPTO.7 A typical assignment is characterized by a unique identifier (i.e., reel frame), the names of the
buyer (i.e., assignee), the seller (i.e., assignor), the date that the transaction agreement was signed (execu-
tion date), and the patent numbers or patent applications that are traded per assignment.8 In constructing
5The localization of knowledge flows has been considerably tested in the spillover literature, which almost unanimously docu-
ments that physical distance does matter and spillovers are constrained geographically (Jaffe et al., 1993; Peri, 2005; Thompson, 2006;
Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2011).
6The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, in such models, yields inconsistent estimates (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, 2010).
For a formal development of negative binomial model, see Hausman et al. (1986).
7In the US, when entities transfer US issued patents to other entities, they disclose such transactions to the USPTO. The latter are
called assignments.
8There is also a field in the assignment data in which entities can disclose the justification for the transfer. However, the justification,
in most cases, is a generic one (i.e. assignment of assignor’s interest). Therefore, it is really difficult to extract information from that
field.
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our patent dataset, we faced two main challenges when employing assignment data. The first relates to the
fact that entities are not required to disclose transactions to the USPTO. However, for legal and perhaps
accounting reasons, they have incentives to do so.9 A challenge associated with using assignment data is
that it is still likely that a number of transactions have not been disclosed to the USPTO due to negligence
or to strategic behavior. In any case, we do not expect this to be systematic for aggregated transactions
across geographic areas. An additional challenge is associated with excluding ’routine’ transactions. In the
US, only an individual can file for a patent application. Subsequently, this individual may re-assign the
patent application (or patent) to her firm or institution where she is employed. These transactions are also
included to the dataset. Thus, the challenge here is to isolate the economically meaningful re-assignments
and discard otherwise. Taking these two challenges into consideration, we end up having 96,478 patents is-
sued between 1995 and 2010 that have been traded from US located entities and are associated with 102,876
transactions for which we have location information for both the assignor and assignee.
There is a many-to-many relationship between patents and transactions. That is, transactions may con-
tain more than one patents and a patent may be transacted more than once. To construct the flows of
patents, we aggregate the number of patents that have been traded from entities located in origin state to
entities in destination state for any year. For patents, which are traded more than once, each transaction
is registered as a new transaction and, therefore, counted accordingly.Therefore for patents traded more
than once, and for robustness purposes, we construct two alternative measures of patent flows. The first is
called, ’first flow’ and considers, for each patent, only its first assignment, ignoring the rest of its transac-
tions. The second measure is called ’last flow’ and for each patent excludes all the intermediate transactions
and records only the assignment between the first and last entity. For example, for a certain patent which
is sold from California to New York state and then from New York state to Texas, the measure ’all flows’
registers both transactions, while the other two measures register only one transaction: ’first flow’ registers
the transaction between California to New York state, and ’last flow’ registers the one between California
to Texas.
Citations of traded patents data originate from the work of Lai et al. (2011), which is publicly available.
The database contains citations of all US issued patents up until 2010. We construct bilateral citation flows
between states for the period 1995-2010 by considering citations made from 1995 to 2010 to patents issued
between 1995-2010. To construct bilateral citation flows across states, we consider the location of the lead
inventor (written on the patent document wrapper) for all (citing and cited) patents.
Finally, the geographic distance (in miles) between two states is the distance between each state’s geo-
graphic center calculated as the crow flies. This information is obtained from Google Maps.10 Information
on a state’s R&D expenditure is extracted from the National Science Foundation Science and Engineering
State Profiles.
Table 1 below provides the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our model.




Table 1: Summary Statistics
variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Patent Trade All Flows 42432 3.86 37.02 0 2699
Patent Trade First Flow 42432 3.22 31.38 0 2343
Patent Trade Last Flow 42432 3.22 30.36 0 2259
Citation Flows 42432 46.60 374.14 0 22727
State Border 2652 0.08 0.28 0 1
Nearby States [< 500 miles] 2652 0.11 0.32 0 1
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] 2652 0.50 0.50 0 1
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] 2652 0.26 0.44 0 1
Note: Patent Trade All Flows, Patent Trade First Flow, Patent Trade Last Flow, and
Citation Flows, are occurrences; State Border is dummy (1 if states for common border, 0
otherwise); Distance classes: Nearby States [< 500 miles], Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles], and
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] are dummies (1 if states locate with the class, 0 otherwise).
According to Table 1, for the period under investigation, states, on average, trade about 3 to 4 patents
per year and exchange about 47 citations per year. On average, each state pair is 8% likely to be neighboring
with each other. Furthermore, 11% of all possible pairs of states are closer than 500 miles and do not share
common state border, 50% are located in a distance of 500 to 1,500 miles, and 26% in a distance of larger
than 1,500 miles.
Table A.1 in the Appendix reports summary statistics per state. States like California (CA), New York
(NY), Illinois (IL), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), and Texas (TX) are top patent producers, traders
and citers of patents. These states also enjoy high R&D spending. In the opposite side of the spectrum are
the states of Alaska (AK), Hawaii (HI), the Dakotas (SD and ND) and Wyoming (WY). Overall, summary
statistics per state reveal a large variety of patterns.
Below, Figure 1 shows the production of innovation in the US. As it is apparent, intense innovation
activity is concentrated in few states in the US. More than 60% of production of patents takes place in
five states, California (CA) and New York (NY), which stand out among the top producers, followed by
Texas (TX), Illinois (IL), and New Jersey (NJ). The least involved states in producing innovation are Alaska
(AK), Hawaii (HI), North Dakota (ND), South Dakota (SD), and Wyoming (WY). Moreover, states which
are patent production leaders are also top performers in patent citations and patent trades.





California with 228,780 Patents, New York with 114,378 Patents 
 
Number of Patents per State
Figure 2 shows the distribution of patent transactions across states in the US.
7





Number of Patents Traded From Each State
As one observes, states that produce large volumes of patents (see Figure 1, above) are the ones greatly
involved in patent transactions.
Lastly, Figure 3 visualizes our data and depicts the decay of patent transaction flows moving out of a
state, out of the nearby neighbor, and out by steps of 1,000 miles. Bold line represents early period flows,
1995-2002 and light, dashed line late period flows, 2003-2010.



















WithinState Neighbor 0−500Miles 500−1500Miles >1500Miles Out Of Countr
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2003−2010
The evidence from the figure above confirms the significance of nearness in shaping patent transaction
flows. The decay effect is apparent: state border and distance restricts the trade of patents. There is a
sharp decrease of flows and only a small share crosses 500 miles. As the distance becomes large enough -
more than 1,500 miles - they pick up again due to the intensity of ideas exchange between East and West
(California). Finally, flows for distance between 500 and 1,500 miles show a pick, which is probably due
to flow exchange of a state with with Illinois, Texas, and Michigan. Prior to 2002, flows (bold line) are
smaller in volume compared to ex post 2002 flows (dashed line). Neighboring patent trade is roughly
similar between the two time periods, implying that in-state patent trade has increased in recent years.
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3. Empirical Results
This section presents our results. We first examine whether geography shapes patent transactions across
the states of US. Then, we proceed by providing more disaggregated evidence from six technological sec-
tors. We further relate to past studies by bringing evidence on the effect of geographic nearness on citation
flows, which is the most investigated type of knowledge flow in the literature. Finally, we derive impli-
cations on a possible relationship between agglomeration and geographic localization of trading patents
across the US.
3.1. How Important is Geography for Patent Transactions across States?
We investigate patent transaction flows originating from an average state and then flows originating
from the most and less innovating states of the US. Accordingly, we present our findings.
Patent Transactions of Average State
Table 2 depicts the results. All columns report negative binomial estimates from equation (1). Column
(i) is the basic specification and shows estimates for all traded patent flows (All Flows). For robustness
purposes, we also report estimates based on first traded patent flow (First Flows) and last traded patent
flow (Last Flows) in columns (ii) and (iii), respectively. Furthermore, columns (iv), (v), and (vi) report patent
flows in accordance with columns (i), (ii), (iii), but for a slightly different sample: we exclude patents issued
between 1995 and 2002, but were traded later between 2003 and 2010. Having kept them in the sample,
any decay of importance of nearness could be attributed also to such patents which take many years to be
transferred, and as they are known for quite long time, they may be transferred further away.11
Recent evidence from the citations literature gives support to this factor, that in addition to a time
dimension there might be an aging dimension in which geographic proximity becomes less important (Li,
2009). Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
As Table 2 shows, estimates are similar across alternative definitions of patent transaction flows and
samples. Each geographic coefficient in Table 2 captures the difference between knowledge flows diffused
in geographic space to in-state knowledge flows, which is our benchmark by model construction. To con-
vert each value to percentage change, one needs to use the exponential formula. We begin our discussion
with estimated coefficients of column (i), which is the basic specification.
The coefficient of State Border implies that states, which are neighbors and, therefore, share common
border, exchange about 93.3% (= 1- e−2.697) less patents to what they would exchange within their borders.
In other words, on crossing a state border, transactions of patents diminish to 6.7% (= e−2.697) compared
to in-state level of transactions. Irrespective of the border, distance also shapes patent transactions. States
that are nearby, in the vicinity of 500 miles, but do not share common borders, exchange 96.6% (= 1- e−3.392)
less patents than what they would exchange within themselves as the coefficient of Distance [< 500 miles]
indicates. Put it differently, the volume of transactions when crossing non-adjacent states, diminishes to
3.4% (= e−3.392) to its in-state level of transaction. Further, patent transactions between states located in an
area between 500 and 1,500 miles decrease by 97.6% (e−3.709) compared to what takes place in-state, as the
coefficient of Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] indicates. In other words, only 2.4% of the patent trade takes place
within a distance of 500 to 1,500 miles. An interesting finding, however, emerges when distance between
states becomes long enough, specifically bigger than 1,500 miles. Although (long) distance exerts a heavy
toll on the volume of patent trade, the reduction of traded patent volume, however, is smaller compared
to the previous distance interval. This seemingly controversial finding is due to the ‘California effect’.
Despite its distance from a typical state, California is an exceptional producer and trader of patents. In sum,
geographic factors (border and distance) comprise a serious limitation of patent transactions across the
states of the US. The trade of patents and, consequently, generated knowledge based on these transactions,
is limited mainly by the state border, which is an important hurdle to out-of-state patent transactions and
11Patents re-assigned before 2002 have a lag between issue date and execution date of 1.41 years, while patents re-assigned after
2002 have a lag of 3.8 years. The difference is statistically significant.
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by geographic distance, where significant knowledge reduction takes place already within a district of 500
miles and any further increase of distance has, practically, no additional reduction effect. States trade 60%
less patents with other countries than what they would trade within their state borders, as the coefficient
of Out o f Country enters negatively and statistically significant.
Table 2: Geographical Effects of Patent Transaction Flows (average state)
All PatentsI Aged Patents ExcludedII
All Flowsa First Flowb Last Flowc All Flowsa First Flowb Last Flowsc
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
State Border -2.697*** -2.661*** -2.556*** -2.684*** -2.609*** -2.507***
(0.169) (0.176) (0.166) (0.169) (0.173) (0.163)
Nearby Area [< 500 miles] -3.392*** -3.375*** -3.319*** -3.384*** -3.314*** -3.253***
(0.135) (0.136) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] -3.709*** -3.719*** -3.626*** -3.701*** -3.659*** -3.567***
(0.136) (0.139) (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.130)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] -3.504*** -3.519*** -3.359*** -3.503*** -3.461*** -3.299***
(0.136) (0.137) (0.135) (0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Out o f Country -0.908*** -0.863*** -0.692*** -0.950*** -0.886*** -0.710***
(0.215) (0.222) (0.210) (0.201) (0.204) (0.195)
Dummy 0.634*** 0.607*** 0.642*** 0.0349 0.108 0.152
(0.189) (0.195) (0.195) (0.202) (0.201) (0.201)
State Border x Dummy -0.303 -0.361 -0.413* -0.345 -0.406 -0.459*
(0.241) (0.256) (0.249) (0.266) (0.273) (0.265)
NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy -0.137 -0.194 -0.198 -0.211 -0.287 -0.315
(0.211) (0.218) (0.217) (0.225) (0.226) (0.223)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] x Dummy -0.178 -0.236 -0.257 -0.267 -0.329 -0.359
(0.209) (0.217) (0.214) (0.223) (0.224) (0.222)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.0978 0.0301 -0.0520 0.0385 -0.0221 -0.114
(0.210) (0.219) (0.217) (0.226) (0.228) (0.226)
Out o f Country x Dummy 0.204 0.165 0.0580 0.296 0.260 0.132
(0.289) (0.298) (0.289) (0.295) (0.299) (0.292)
Constant 3.842*** 3.702*** 3.626*** 3.814*** 3.629*** 3.551***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.117) (0.115)
Observations 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,661 42,687
All columns report negative binomial estimates and heteroskedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). All
regressions include time dummies and origin and destination state fixed-effects. State Border takes the value of
1 for flows exchanged between states i and j which are neighbors (share a common border) and 0 otherwise;
Nearby States [500 miles] takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states that do not share a common border
and their geographical centers are located within a distance of 500 miles, and 0 otherwise; Distance [500− 1, 500 miles]
is a distance class of 500 to 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that
are located within 500 to 1,500 miles distance class, and 0 otherwise; Distance [> 1, 500 miles] is a distance classes
of larger than 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that are located in a
distance larger than 1,500 miles and 0 otherwise; Out o f Country is a dummy and takes the value of 1, if a patent
is traded between a state in the US and a foreign country, and 0 otherwise; Dummy is a time dummy variable
which takes the value of 0 if a patent is traded in the period 1995-2002 and 1 if it is traded in the period 2003-2010;
The variables State Border x Dummy, NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy, Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles] x Dummy,
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy, Out o f Country x Dummy are border-, distance-, region-time interaction terms.
(***): significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
I : All patent included.
II : Excludes patents granted early in the period (before 2002), but traded later (after 2003).
a All Flows considers for each multiply transacted patent, all its flows, as separate ones.
b First Flow considers, for each transacted patent, only its first assignment, ignoring the rest of its transactions.
c Last Flow considers, for each transacted patent, only its last assignment, ignoring the rest of its transactions.
Next, we turn into examining whether there are any time effects shaping the pattern of patent transac-
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tions across the States of the US. As our results show, the coefficient of time dummy, Dummy, is positive
and statistically significant, indicating that over time, or after 2002 in particular, in-state patent exchange
has risen by 88.5% compared to in-state patent trade prior to 2002. This finding does not necessarily trans-
late into increased importance of distance for patent trade over time. As there is an increase, over time,
of patent transactions across states in the US, a higher share of this trade takes place in-state. Concerning
the time and distance interaction terms, states seem to involve in less patent trade with their neighbors
ex post 2002 than ex ante as, over time, there is an additional decrease of patent transactions across states
compared to in-state level of transactions.12 In contrast, there is a noticeable increase of patent trade
between very distant states, more than 1,500 miles, compared to before-2002 as it is evident from from
the coefficient of Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy mainly due to the California effect and its increased
patent production and transaction over time. Lastly, over time, there is no concrete evidence on the pat-
tern of patent transaction localization at national this time level, as the coefficient of the interaction term,
Out o f Country x Dummy, is not statistical significant. Based on the evidence provided by the interactions
terms we cannot argue over greater or lower importance of distance over time as their coefficients appear
to be statistically insignificant.
To sharp the robustness of our results, we have performed several checks. We first consider alternative
definitions of patent transaction flows. More precisely, we estimate the same specification as in column (i),
but with different dependent variables: First Flow in column (ii) and Last Flow in column (iii). Estimates
in both columns are in the vicinity of those reported in column (i). Further robustness for aging effects,
replicates the analysis in columns (i) to (iii), but excluding patents granted early but transacted after 2002.
The estimated effects, reported in columns (iv) to (vi), remain virtually the same.13
Concluding, geographic nearness in terms of border and distance, exerts a strong influence on patent
transactions across states of the US. The general and well-documented finding of geographic restriction of
flows reported in the literature, is corroborated by our results. In particular, local bias on the state level
appears to be quite sturdy in all alternative definitions of patent transactions. The very significant impact
of distance on traded patents across states of the US is at first sight quite surprising and puzzling: unlike
goods, patented ideas are weightless, and distance cannot just proxy only transportation costs.14 Further,
state border appears to confine trade of ideas as it does with trade of goods, and certainly this effect cannot
be attributed to higher transportation costs when a traded patent crosses a state border. Instead, distance
and border could be seen as informational barriers, and therefore can serve as proxies for all types of
informational frictions: agents within a state tend to know much more about each other and each other’s
business and technologies, either because of direct interactions between their citizens or because of better
media coverage. In consequence, distance and border act as barriers to interactions, various micro-cultural
affinities, and networking of economic agents (Saxenian, 1994). It appears that trade of patents requires
intensive information to take place and this is reflected on the size of both border and distance coefficients.
The localization robustness of weightless ideas documented in our study, matches also findings from
quite different lines of research. For example, studies in the financial trade literature, using ’gravity-like’
models have investigated whether geographic distance imposes a hurdle on financial asset transactions,
which are weightless compared to goods. In fact, Portes et al. (2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) exam-
ine the determinants of cross-border assets (corporate bonds equities and treasury bonds) and show that
gravity model explains financial asset transactions at least as well as goods trade transactions and further
document a very strong negative effect of distance on all asset flows.
12One should be careful when reads the effect of the coefficients of the interaction terms of nonlinear models, like ours. For more
detailed discussion, see Ai and Norton (2003).
13A battery of additional robustness tests are also performed, but not presented here. For instance, we dropped from our sample the
very distant states with the most zeros, Alaska and Hawaii. The exclusion of Alaska and Hawaii barely changes the results. Then, we
excluded California, which in terms of patent performance could act as an outlier. Results, available upon request, mildly change, but
overall conclusions drawn hold. A notable difference is that, the (long) distance effect, due to California, i.e., more patent transaction
flows between distant states, disappears. Overall, results do not change in any significant way across different specifications and
sub-samples.
14A large volume of literature has documented the negative impact of geographic distance and borders on the flows of physical
trade. See Wolf (2000) for a discussion on the impact of state border and distance on US trade of goods flows.
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Our estimates confirm the picture emerged in Figure 3 as they capture this significant and sharp drop
when flows cross state border and distance of 500 miles and then their path remains pretty much stable
with some spikes.
Patent Transactions of Top and Least Innovator States
In this section, as a further robustness check, we examine whether the geographic scope of patent trans-
action flows from top innovator states is wider than the average state flows (Peri, 2005).
To explore this aspect, we consider knowledge flows originating only from the top innovator states
when estimating equation (1).
We select the top innovators to be states with the highest R&D spending. The states of California
(CA), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), New Jersey (NJ), and New York, (NY), Texas (TX), Illinois (IL),
Pennsylvania (PA), Maryland (MD), Washington (WA), and Ohio (OH) are among the top 10 states in R&D
spending and account for about 70% of the total US R&D activity in our sample. Therefore, they may act
as innovation leaders.
Table 3 depicts the results. Columns in Table 3 are in accordance with those of Table 2. The only differ-
ence is that the most innovative states, the top innovators, are the only source, j, of the patent transaction
flows in equation (1). Again, one should read the estimated coefficient in the same way as explained in the
previous section.
Estimates show that top leaders’ patent transaction flows are about equally geographically localized,
both in terms of state border and distance, as those of the average state flows. Consequently, our results
do not confirm the broader reach of leaders’ traded patent flows and potential generated knowledge from
the leaders via patent exchange. The analysis of leaders’ flows confirms that independent of the origin of
a state, i.e., whether the state is an average or innovator state, the spatial reach of patent exchange, and
consequent knowledge flows generated, is strongly geographically confined.
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Table 3: Geographical Effects of Patent Transaction Flows in the US (top innovators)
All PatentsI Aged Patents ExcludedII
All Flowsa First Flowb Last Flowc All Flowsa First Flowb Last Flowsc
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
State Border -2.797*** -2.750*** -2.632*** -2.782*** -2.670*** -2.573***
(0.228) (0.235) (0.219) (0.227) (0.232) (0.217)
Nearby Area [< 500 miles] -3.952*** -3.947*** -3.836*** -3.947*** -3.856*** -3.745***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.176) (0.178) (0.176) (0.173)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] -4.019*** -4.057*** -3.965*** -4.012*** -3.966*** -3.877***
(0.182) (0.181) (0.171) (0.181) (0.178) (0.168)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] -3.604*** -3.615*** -3.436*** -3.606*** -3.526*** -3.345***
(0.175) (0.175) (0.171) (0.173) (0.170) (0.167)
Out o f Country -0.896*** -0.854*** -0.672** -0.952*** -0.871*** -0.687***
(0.279) (0.287) (0.270) (0.260) (0.265) (0.252)
Dummy 0.735*** 0.705*** 0.760*** 0.111 0.253 0.315
(0.240) (0.242) (0.241) (0.256) (0.252) (0.251)
State Border x Dummy -0.397 -0.434 -0.479 -0.333 -0.452 -0.477
(0.318) (0.330) (0.317) (0.349) (0.354) (0.339)
NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy -0.159 -0.172 -0.245 -0.242 -0.341 -0.433
(0.274) (0.281) (0.277) (0.295) (0.293) (0.287)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] x Dummy -0.215 -0.264 -0.289 -0.234 -0.349 -0.366
(0.274) (0.280) (0.273) (0.298) (0.296) (0.289)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.00579 -0.0668 -0.168 -0.0467 -0.174 -0.287
(0.264) (0.268) (0.265) (0.282) (0.279) (0.276)
Out o f Country x Dummy 0.103 0.0685 -0.0553 0.244 0.169 0.0303
(0.363) (0.369) (0.356) (0.370) (0.372) (0.362)
Constant 5.115*** 4.983*** 4.893*** 5.088*** 4.867*** 4.774***
(0.157) (0.156) (0.153) (0.156) (0.152) (0.151)
Observations 8,320 8,320 8,320 8,320 8,425 8,436
All columns report negative binomial estimates and heterokcedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). All
regressions include time dummies and origin and destination state fixed-effects. State Border takes the value of
1 for flows exchanged between states i and j which are neighbors (share a common border) and 0 otherwise;
Nearby States [500 miles] takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states that do not share a common border
and their geographical centers are located within a distance of 500 miles, and 0 otherwise; Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] is
a distance class of 500 to 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that are located
within 500 to 1,500 miles distance class, and 0 otherwise; Distance [> 1, 500 miles] is a distance classes of larger than
1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that are located in a distance larger than
1,500 miles and 0 otherwise; Out o f Country is a dummy and takes the value of 1, if a patent is traded between a state in
the US and a foreign country, and 0 otherwise; Dummy is a time dummy variable which takes the value of 0 if a patent
is traded in the period 1995-2002 and 1 if it is traded in the period 2003-2010; The variables State Border x Dummy,
NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy, Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles] x Dummy, Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy,
Out o f Country x Dummy are border-, distance-, region-time interaction terms. (***): significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Top innovator states: California (CA), Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), New Jersey (NJ), and
New York, (NY), Texas (TX), Illinois (IL), Pennsylvania (PA), Maryland (MD), Washington (WA), and Ohio (OH).
I : All patent included.
II : Excludes patents granted early in the period (before 2002) but traded later (after 2003).
a All Flows considers for each multiply transacted patent, all its flows originating from the top 10 innovators, as sepa-
rate ones.
b First Flow considers, for each transacted patent originating from the top 10 innovators, only its first assignment,
ignoring the rest of its transactions.
c Last Flow considers, for each transacted patent originating from the top 10 innovators, only its last assignment, ig-
noring the rest of its transactions.
Next, we consider knowledge flows originating from the rest forty states, excluding flows originating
from the top innovators. Estimates are displayed in Table 4. Results show that patent transaction flows
originating from the lower innovative states are slightly less localized than the average state and top in-
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novative state. In addition, comparing the Dummy coefficient between Table 3 and Table 4, we observe
that it is smaller in the case of patent flows originating from the less innovative states compared to patent
flows originating from the top innovative states. Moreover, the estimate of Dummy for the case of the less
innovative states is negative in columns (4) and (5), though borderline significant.
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Table 4: Geographical Effects of Patent Transaction Flows in the US (excl. top innovators)
All PatentsI Aged Patents ExcludedII
All Flowsa First Flowb Last Flowc All Flowsa First Flowb Last Flowsc
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
State Border -2.666*** -2.651*** -2.558*** -2.663*** -2.619*** -2.526***
(0.173) (0.187) (0.177) (0.176) (0.184) (0.174)
Nearby Area [< 500 miles] -2.952*** -2.919*** -2.917*** -2.944*** -2.874*** -2.863***
(0.148) (0.155) (0.152) (0.150) (0.152) (0.148)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] -3.326*** -3.307*** -3.219*** -3.321*** -3.268*** -3.176***
(0.151) (0.162) (0.157) (0.153) (0.159) (0.155)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] -3.664*** -3.698*** -3.562*** -3.664*** -3.663*** -3.523***
(0.150) (0.155) (0.153) (0.151) (0.152) (0.149)
Out o f Country -1.111*** -1.065*** -0.904*** -1.122*** -1.065*** -0.902***
(0.169) (0.177) (0.170) (0.170) (0.173) (0.166)
Dummy 0.362** 0.310** 0.326** -0.270* -0.246* -0.213
(0.144) (0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.149) (0.147)
State Border x Dummy -0.0335 -0.0935 -0.184 -0.183 -0.201 -0.311
(0.208) (0.223) (0.214) (0.217) (0.229) (0.221)
NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy 0.0611 -0.0143 0.0457 0.0535 -0.0124 0.0199
(0.190) (0.195) (0.191) (0.198) (0.201) (0.197)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.0356 -0.000792 -0.0178 -0.0678 -0.0834 -0.130
(0.184) (0.192) (0.187) (0.183) (0.190) (0.186)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.354* 0.333 0.266 0.374 0.389 0.315
(0.202) (0.218) (0.214) (0.235) (0.250) (0.244)
Out o f Country x Dummy 0.476** 0.460** 0.362 0.542** 0.529** 0.407*
(0.224) (0.234) (0.227) (0.238) (0.242) (0.236)
Constant 3.028*** 2.877*** 2.818*** 3.004*** 2.826*** 2.764***
(0.121) (0.128) (0.127) (0.123) (0.125) (0.124)
Observations 34,112 34,112 34,112 34,112 34,236 34,251
All columns report negative binomial estimates and heterokcedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). All
regressions include time dummies and origin and destination state fixed-effects. State Border takes the value of
1 for flows exchanged between states i and j which are neighbors (share a common border) and 0 otherwise;
Nearby States [500 miles] takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states that do not share a common border
and their geographical centers are located within a distance of 500 miles, and 0 otherwise; Distance [500− 1, 500 miles]
is a distance class of 500 to 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that
are located within 500 to 1,500 miles distance class, and 0 otherwise; Distance [> 1, 500 miles] is a distance classes
of larger than 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that are located in a
distance larger than 1,500 miles and 0 otherwise; Out o f Country is a dummy and takes the value of 1, if a patent
is traded between a state in the US and a foreign country, and 0 otherwise; Dummy is a time dummy variable
which takes the value of 0 if a patent is traded in the period 1995-2002 and 1 if it is traded in the period 2003-2010;
The variables State Border x Dummy, NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy, Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles] x Dummy,
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy, Out o f Country x Dummy are border-, distance-, region-time interaction terms.
(***): significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Top innovator states (which are excluded): California (CA),
Massachusetts (MA), Michigan (MI), New Jersey (NJ), and New York, (NY), Texas (TX), Illinois (IL), Pennsylvania
(PA), Maryland (MD), Washington (WA), and Ohio (OH).
I : All patent included.
II : Excludes patents granted early in the period (before 2002) but traded later (after 2003).
a All Flows considers for each multiply transacted patent, all its flows originating from the 40 less innovative states, as
separate ones.
b First Flow considers, for each transacted patent originating from the 40 less innovative states, only its first assign-
ment, ignoring the rest of its transactions.
c Last Flow considers, for each transacted patent originating from the 40 less innovative states, only its last assignment,
ignoring the rest of its transactions.
The above comparison implies that flows originating from top innovators are on average more localized
than flows originating from the less innovative states. This finding indicates that top innovators trade
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more within the state than less innovative states, which potentially seek for buyers outside the state. This
difference becomes even stronger, in more recent years as the coefficient of Dummy shows, where top
innovators trade more within the state compared to less innovative states.
3.2. How Important is Geography for Patent Transactions across US Technological Sectors?
The estimates of the previous section showed a strong degree of localization of patent transactions. In
this section, we dig deeper and investigate whether localization of patent exchange is still the case across six
different technology fields namely, chemical (Chemical), computer and communication (Computers), drugs
and medical (Drug), electrical and electronic components, (Electronics), mechanical machinery (Mechanical),
and all other (Others) sector.15
Estimates are reported in Table 5 below and read in the same way as explained in the previous section.
Two noteworthy findings emerge from Table 5: first, there is no much variability of geographic and
time effects across sectors, as estimates are similar across sectors and, second, sector-specific estimates are
close and similar in statistical significance to aggregate (state level) estimates.
As sector-specific estimates show, state border continues to remain an important hurdle for patent trans-
actions across all sectors, with Drug and Others to be the sectors most strongly affected as 94% of the patent
trade in these sectors takes place in-state than across states, whereas the information technology sectors,
Electronics and Computers, appear to be the least affected as 93% of the patent trade in these sectors takes
place in-state than across states. The impact of geographic distance on trade of patents across US tech-
nology fields is even stronger. Mechanical and Others sectors are highly restricted by distance as, on av-
erage, distant states exchange 98% less patents compared to what they trade in-state. Patent exchange in
Computers and Electronics is mildly more stretched in space compared to the rest of the sectors as distant
states exchange about 97% less patents between each other in these sectors compared to what they trade
within their state border. Therefore, inter-state patent trade is by far much smaller compared to in-state
trade across all sectors and the former is massively restricted by state border and geographic distance.
15The patent classification in the six technology fields is based on their primary US Classification, which, in turn, relies on Hall et al.
(2001) .
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Table 5: Geographical Effects of Patent Transactions across Technological Sectors (All Flows)
Chemical Computers Drugs Electronics Mechanical Others
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
State Border -2.794*** -2.676*** -2.825*** -2.746*** -2.776*** -2.882***
(0.207) (0.339) (0.259) (0.280) (0.156) (0.138)
Nearby Area [< 500 miles] -3.387*** -3.667*** -3.413*** -3.326*** -3.443*** -3.498***
(0.188) (0.211) (0.225) (0.189) (0.146) (0.130)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] -3.784*** -3.585*** -3.726*** -3.807*** -3.836*** -3.944***
(0.175) (0.227) (0.198) (0.184) (0.136) (0.113)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] -3.794*** -3.216*** -3.471*** -3.311*** -3.841*** -4.002***
(0.190) (0.201) (0.208) (0.179) (0.144) (0.120)
Out o f Country -1.057*** -0.623* -1.100*** -0.401 -1.497*** -1.558***
(0.198) (0.336) (0.228) (0.328) (0.172) (0.158)
Dummy 0.210 0.998*** 0.504* 0.779*** 0.603*** 0.388***
(0.214) (0.261) (0.261) (0.254) (0.209) (0.142)
State Border x Dummy 0.152 -0.384 -0.321 -0.595 -0.325 -0.151
(0.302) (0.454) (0.361) (0.382) (0.265) (0.196)
NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy -0.0525 -0.0660 0.259 -0.367 -0.314 -0.104
(0.256) (0.313) (0.336) (0.309) (0.243) (0.184)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.103 -0.462 -0.134 -0.282 -0.0821 0.0628
(0.240) (0.317) (0.290) (0.292) (0.263) (0.163)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.0902 0.0428 0.247 -0.222 0.0180 0.242
(0.250) (0.306) (0.300) (0.299) (0.240) (0.183)
Out o f Country x Dummy 0.299 0.0543 0.294 0.00136 0.342 0.318
(0.272) (0.426) (0.327) (0.425) (0.279) (0.226)
Constant 2.014*** 2.232*** 2.003*** 1.944*** 1.990*** 2.438***
(0.160) (0.172) (0.173) (0.152) (0.114) (0.0998)
Observations 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432
All columns report negative binomial estimates and heteroskedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). All
regressions include time dummies and origin and destination state fixed-effects. State Border takes the value of
1 for flows exchanged between states i and j which are neighbors (share a common border) and 0 otherwise;
Nearby States [500 miles] takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states that do not share a common border
and their geographical centers are located within a distance of 500 miles, and 0 otherwise; Distance [500− 1, 500 miles]
is a distance class of 500 to 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that
are located within 500 to 1,500 miles distance class, and 0 otherwise; Distance [> 1, 500 miles] is a distance classes
of larger than 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that are located in a
distance larger than 1,500 miles and 0 otherwise; Out o f Country is a dummy and takes the value of 1, if a patent
is traded between a state in the US and a foreign country, and 0 otherwise; Dummy is a time dummy variable
which takes the value of 0 if a patent is traded in the period 1995-2002 and 1 if it is traded in the period 2003-2010;
The variables State Border x Dummy, NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy, Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles] x Dummy,
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy, Out o f Country x Dummy are border-, distance-, region-time interaction terms.
(***): significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Overall, our sector-specific findings emphasize that patent transactions in all sectors are highly geo-
graphically confined. Among sectors, the geographic spread of patent transactions, and knowledge gen-
erated via traded patents, in the information technology sectors is the most far reached. A high degree
of international standardization in computer language and computer procedures as well as in electronics,
patent transactions in these sector reach farther in states and countries. Mechanical sector’s technologies,
on the other hand, are more linked to the specificities of regional economies and probably less engaged
into globalization. Therefore, knowledge flows generated via patent transactions in this sector is less far
reaching. Our findings about the localization of knowledge flows generated in US sectors are consistent
with evidence provided from the (patent-citation) literature (Peri, 2005; Griffith et al., 2011).
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3.3. Comparison with Citation Flows
To get a better sense of the size of our coefficients - as there is no study so far that has explored the
geographic effects of patent transactions in the US - we compare, in this section, our patent trade geographic
estimates with those of citations’. To this purpose, we estimate equation (1) for citation (of traded patents)
flows across states in the US. Table 6 below presents our results based on state level (column (i)) and sector
level (columns (ii) to (vii)) analyses. The coefficients are read in the same manner as before.
The state level estimates of citation flows in column (i) are somewhat smaller than that of their patent
transaction counterparts reported in Table 2. The border and (average) distance effects on citation flows
are about 2% and 5%, respectively, smaller than those of patent transaction flows. A further interesting
geographic aspect of citation flows is that they are less restricted compared to patent transaction flows,
when distance between states becomes more than 1,500 miles, as the California effect is at work. We cannot
draw, however, any further conclusion over the time pattern of localization of citation flows, neither at
a state nor at a national level as the time dummy and time-distance interaction terms are all statistically
insignificant.
Moving to sector level analysis for citation flows performed in columns (ii) to (vii), the sector-specific
border estimates are equal (Drugs) or up to 4-5% (Mechanical & Others) smaller than their patent trans-
action counterparts reported in Table 5. Compared to exchanging patents, neighboring states exchange
more citations in these sectors. Therefore, state border confines citation flows less than it confines traded
patent flows. Furthermore, citation flows are more far stretched in space by 4% (Chemical, Drugs, and
Electronics) up to 7% (Computers) compared to traded patent flows. The California effect is also apparent
for the sectoral citation flows - quite strong particularly for Computers and Electronics. Again, we cannot
elaborate more on time patterns of sectoral citation flows - with the only exemption of Electronics sector
where citation flows between a state and a foreign country have increased over time - as time dummy and
interaction terms are, in all other cases, statistically insignificant.
Overall, we find that citation flows across states of the US are less geographically localized than flows
of patent trade. Geographical distance severely reduces the volume of traded patents between East and
West (California) Coast, whereas, it has a milder effect on citation flows. The potential need for the patent
buyer to maintain contact with the inventor attaches a more nuance role to geography in shaping patent
trade than shaping citations and consequent knowledge generated. To the extent that purchased patented
technology plays a role in the buyer’s production, distance and border could act as informational barriers,
and serve as proxies for all types of informational frictions. Agents within a state tend to know much more
about each other and each other’s business and technologies, either because of direct interactions between
their citizens or because of better media coverage. Therefore, distance and border also act as barriers to
social connectedness (micro-cultural affinities) and networking of economic agents. Such social proximi-
ties have been identified in the literature (Saxenian, 1994) as important factors for knowledge exchange.16
Consequently, informal knowledge flows that operate via non-market mechanisms, such as exchange of
citations, transcend easier a state border and are more diffused in space than formal knowledge flows that
originate from market channels, such as patent transactions, as in the former case social proximities may
play a less significant role.17
16Breschi and Lissoni (2004) apply a social network analysis to derive maps of social connectedness among patent inventors. The
probability to observe a citation is positively influenced by social proximity of the inventors, as the authors argue.
17The origin of citations, i.e., whether are included by inventors or examiners on the patent document may have, however, different
implications for the geographic stretched of citation flows. A study by Criscuolo and Verspagen (2008) examines patents from the
European Patent Office (EPO) and exploits the distinction the EPO provides about the source of patent citations (since 1979). The
authors find that inventor-origin citations are more geographically localized than their examiner-origin counterparts as inventors
tend to choose their citations from within a narrower geographical space than examiners do. Consequently, a more detailed analysis
on the reach of citation flows and to the extent that they represent actual knowledge and not ‘noise’, it would require the distinction
into inventor- versus examiner-origin citations. The USPTO, however, has allowed such distinction only since 2001 (Alcacer and
Gittelman, 2006; Thompson, 2006). Performing such analysis considerably restricts the data set and scope of this paper and, therefore,
left for future investigation.
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Table 6: Geographical Effects of Citation Flows across States in the US
States Chemical Computers Drugs Electronics Mechanical Others
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
State Border -2.472*** -2.524*** -2.349*** -2.891*** -2.540*** -2.351*** -2.310***
(0.211) (0.182) (0.261) (0.235) (0.241) (0.194) (0.176)
Nearby Area [< 500 miles] -2.856*** -2.721*** -2.799*** -3.056*** -2.987*** -2.823*** -2.756***
(0.214) (0.183) (0.262) (0.244) (0.239) (0.193) (0.175)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] -2.880*** -3.029*** -2.743*** -2.971*** -3.058*** -2.931*** -2.822***
(0.214) (0.177) (0.263) (0.242) (0.236) (0.190) (0.174)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] -2.185*** -2.676*** -1.866*** -2.359*** -2.288*** -2.380*** -2.322***
(0.214) (0.182) (0.261) (0.239) (0.238) (0.192) (0.175)
Out o f Country 0.269 0.113 0.477 -0.254 0.510* 0.301 0.178
(0.243) (0.199) (0.294) (0.266) (0.268) (0.216) (0.199)
Dummy -0.0191 -0.0844 -0.175 -0.0727 0.237 0.0653 0.181
(0.295) (0.263) (0.368) (0.347) (0.333) (0.270) (0.234)
State Border x Dummy 0.102 0.139 0.0406 0.216 0.152 0.132 -0.0759
(0.296) (0.277) (0.370) (0.348) (0.350) (0.283) (0.245)
NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy -0.00770 -0.0510 0.0414 0.0736 0.0167 0.0533 -0.286
(0.303) (0.274) (0.376) (0.362) (0.345) (0.280) (0.243)
Distance [500− 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.0838 0.179 0.109 0.196 0.0589 0.0464 -0.131
(0.303) (0.267) (0.377) (0.361) (0.341) (0.277) (0.242)
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy 0.0786 0.172 0.0810 0.248 0.0584 0.0724 -0.120
(0.301) (0.274) (0.373) (0.353) (0.342) (0.278) (0.242)
Out o f Country x Dummy -0.107 -0.148 -0.0426 -0.173 -0.0722 -0.123 -0.352
(0.349) (0.301) (0.428) (0.396) (0.389) (0.317) (0.277)
Constant 5.981*** 3.641*** 4.825*** 4.422*** 3.910*** 3.719*** 4.088***
(0.210) (0.173) (0.257) (0.233) (0.231) (0.186) (0.169)
Observations 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432 42,432
All columns report negative binomial estimates and heteroscedastic robust standard errors (in parentheses). All regressions
include time dummies and origin and destination state fixed-effects. State Border takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged be-
tween states i and j which are neighbors (share a common border) and 0 otherwise; Nearby States [500 miles] takes the value
of 1 for flows exchanged between states that do not share a common border and their geographical centers are located within
a distance of 500 miles, and 0 otherwise; Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles] is a distance class of 500 to 1,500 miles and takes the
value of 1 for flows exchanged between states i and j that are located within 500 to 1,500 miles distance class, and 0 other-
wise; Distance [> 1, 500 miles] is a distance classes of larger than 1,500 miles and takes the value of 1 for flows exchanged
between states i and j that are located in a distance larger than 1,500 miles and 0 otherwise; Dummy is a time dummy vari-
able which takes the value of 0 if a patent is traded in the period 1995-2002 and 1 if it is traded in the period 2003-2010;
Out o f Country is a dummy and takes the value of 1, if a patent is traded between a state in the US and a foreign country, and
0 otherwise; The variables State Border x Dummy, NearbyArea [< 500 miles] x Dummy, Distance [500 − 1, 500 miles] x Dummy,
Distance [> 1, 500 miles] x Dummy, Out o f Country x Dummy are border-, distance-, region-time interaction terms. (***): signifi-
cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Our evidence is in line with that documented in Mowery and Ziedonis (2001), the single study in
the literature that examined the geographic reach of knowledge flows based on citation as well as on li-
censed university patent flows. Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) find that geographic distance matters more
for university-generated knowledge flows that operate through the market of contracts (patent licenses) to
university-generated knowledge flows that operate through non-market channels. Contrary to some argu-
ments stated in the literature (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996, p. 651), we too find that geographic proximity
is more essential to the operation of market contracts (trade of patents) compared to the operation of non-
market flows based on citation flows.18
3.4. Agglomeration and Geographic Localization
At this point, we would like to add some additional consideration of the potential role of industry
(sector) agglomeration in the localization effect in the trade of patents found earlier.19 Perhaps, patent
transfer is more likely within a state simply because the majority of firms in an industry are also clustered
in that state. Therefore, in this section we would like to further explore whether some technological sectors
are more geographically concentrated than other sectors and whether the innovation status of a state (i.e.,
top v.s. low innovator) also relates to agglomeration issues.
In general, the terms "agglomeration" or "cluster" are used to refer to various forms of geographic con-
centrations (Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Martin and Sunley, 2003). The degree of concentration provides in-
sights into the relative agglomeration or dispersion of a particular sector and into the respective levels of
concentration between sectors. The literature offers several indices to measure the spatial concentration of
activities, namely the concentration ratio, the Hirshman-Herfindhal index, the locational Gini coefficients,
the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) concentration index, the location quotient among others.20
We focus here on the most widely used measures, the locational Gini coefficient, the location quotient
(LQ), and the Hirshman-Herfindhal Index (HHI). The output of a sector or state is the number of patents
it produces and therefore we examine whether such production is concentrated in some sectors and some
states. We begin with the locational Gini coefficient, which is defined as the maximum difference between
the patent production (Sji ) in sector i (i = 1,..., 6) in state j (j = 1,..., 50) and the total patent production (Ti)




∣∣Sji/∑6i=1 Sji − Ti/∑6i=1 Ti∣∣).
It is a summary measure of spatial dispersion derived from a spatial Lorenz curve. Smaller values of
locational Gini coefficient indicate similarity between spatial distribution of sector i and country’s activity.
Table 7 below presents the locational Gini coefficient for the whole sample period, as well as for sub-
periods, for six technological sectors.
Table 7: Concentration of Technological Sectors in the US (locational Gini coefficients)
period Chemical Computers Drugs Electronics Mechanical Others
1995-2010 0.144 0.181 0.174 0.135 0.171 0.103
1995-2002 0.141 0.195 0.159 0.133 0.151 0.093
2003-2010 0.147 0.167 0.189 0.138 0.191 0.113
18Audretsch and Feldman (1996) studied interactions between university-based scientists and biotechnology firms based on disclo-
sures in firms’ initial public offering documents about academic researchers’ roles in the firms.
19We thank an anonymous referee who suggested such exploration.
20See Kim et al. (2000), Marcon and Puech (2003), and Holmes and Stevens (2004) for a review.
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We observe that the locational Gini coefficients do not vary much across technological sectors. Sectors
such as Others and Electronics appear to be the least concentrated (agglomerated) as opposed to Computers
and Drugs, which exhibit the highest concentration across states of the US. Over time, localization slightly
increases, as sub-period Gini coefficients indicate, with the exception of the Computers sector, where the
opposite effect takes place.
Figure 4 below graphically depicts the locational Gini coefficient in the two sub-periods: 1995-2002
(blue boxes) and 2003-2010 (red boxes).
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1995-2002 2003-2010
Next, we proceed with examining whether there is agglomeration of innovation activity within a state.
In doing so, we rely on the location quotient (LQ) index, which is another common approach to spatially
delimit agglomeration. The LQ for sector i in region j is equal to the percentage of total patent production











, where i is sector (i= 1,..., 6) , j is state (j=1,..., 50).
A region is said to be specialized in one sector if it has an LQ over 1. In such a case, this sector is over-
represented within this region. This property is used to identify agglomerations for a particular sector,
which are then defined as the areas with high LQs for that sector.
In addition to LQ index, we also employ the Hirshman-Herfindhal index (HHI), which shows whether
the production is concentrated in few or many firms and is calculated by summing the squared market
shares of all of the firms in the industry. In our case, we sum up the squared market shares (si) of all
technological sectors for each state j. Formally,
HHI = ∑6i=1 s
2
i .
The HHI ranges between 0 (low concentration) and 1 ((high concentration).
Table A.2 in the Appendix provides the location quotient for the six technological fields (sectors) and
HHI per state.
According to that Table, many states show LQ index higher than one and therefore exhibit some con-
centration especially in Others (35 out of 50 states) and Mechanical (33 out of 50 states) sectors, while only
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few states (15 out of 50) show concentration in Computers.21
The top innovator states have HHI lower that the sample mean (0.249) and, therefore, exhibit less con-
centration with respect to the ‘average’ state. For the remaining 40 states, concentration patterns vary with
respect to the sample mean, but overall, the dispersion of the HHI across states is rather small (0.044). Over
time, there is not any noteworthy change neither in the HHI across states nor in its dispersion across states,
as the HHIs indicate for the two sub-periods.
In sum, our evidence does not point to the emergence of significant agglomeration effect across ge-
ographic and technological space and time; so does the localization effect found earlier. The absence of
variability in both patterns makes us cautious to establish a rigorous relationship between them.
4. Conclusion
Informal market channels of knowledge flows have received considerable attention in the economics of
innovation. Studies have shown that they are significant components in the innovation process and that
they are constrained by geographic distance; a result similar to the trade literature. In addition, some works
have claimed that geographic distance plays a less significant role in recent years due to the increasingly
interconnected world.
Using recently developed detailed data provided by the Office of the Chief Economist of re-assigned
patents, we offer new insights on these important issues by adding a market channel of knowledge transfer,
which has not yet comprehensively explored so far, the market of patents and knowledge flows based on
patent transactions. We examine whether geographic and time effects shape patent transactions across
states and sectors in the US and compare our findings with those of citation flows. Our results support
that geographic nearness, in terms of distance and contingency, also matters for patent trade, as it has been
massively documented in the trade and patent-citation literature. They further confirm that knowledge,
generated from innovative ideas, which are patented and traded, are more geographically restricted and,
therefore, their effective reach is less far stretched in space compared to knowledge flows based on citations.
Although border and distance do not proxy transportation costs, as they do for goods trade - ideas are
weightless - they could act as informational barriers, and therefore can hamper contacts and consequently
patent transactions.
Our findings clearly support the presence of strong localization at a state level for patent transactions
and to a lesser extent for citations. Although there is evidence of more patent trade in-state rather than
across states, it is not, per se, a nuance evidence of higher importance of distance and border over time,
neither for state nor for sector patent trade (and citation) flows. The information technology sectors, how-
ever consist a notable exemption. We also explore whether industry agglomeration relates to geographic
localization found in the trading of ideas. We found no rigorous association. Overall, our results remain
robust across sub-samples and alternative specifications.
The next research challenge is to further explore the causes of localization of patent trade. The rela-
tionship of agglomeration and localization of patent trade deserves some further investigation. An issue
deserving also further inquiry is the role of social proximity in shaping the trade of ideas. Learning more
about the causes of localization is important for assessing welfare consequences. Furthermore, another
important research avenue is the pursue of the joint estimation of the geographic stretch of embodied and
disembodied knowledge flows in one common framework and examine their individual effects on local
production of innovation.
21The highest vales of LQ appear in the state of Pennsylvania for Chemical, California for Computers, Maryland for Drugs, New
York for Electronics, Michigan for Mechanical, and Illinois for Others.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Summary Statistics per State
State Traded Patents Citations R&D activity
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
AK 6.31 2.94 36.56 24.78 0.20 0.06
AL 88.13 47.23 1150.56 802.59 2.15 0.33
AR 31.94 20.16 281.88 179.00 0.40 0.06
AZ 176.88 95.16 2624.38 1658.99 3.07 1.05
CA 3395.44 1653.58 52919.94 35573.45 48.14 7.72
CO 333.50 135.23 5401.81 3507.14 4.14 0.78
CT 354.69 148.18 4146.00 2715.65 5.12 1.68
DE 663.63 476.70 3512.75 2273.66 1.50 0.40
FL 453.06 208.82 5418.50 3714.18 4.81 0.61
GA 233.56 103.64 3591.00 2484.46 2.81 0.73
HI 9.44 5.67 138.06 115.30 0.40 0.09
IA 89.75 47.08 1180.44 692.48 1.22 0.21
ID 129.38 159.94 2332.31 1680.63 1.01 0.31
IL 592.31 246.30 6348.94 4094.11 9.70 1.56
IN 179.25 78.99 2197.19 1532.68 3.61 0.78
KS 64.19 24.79 676.44 469.97 1.40 0.58
KY 52.13 34.06 583.31 503.72 0.81 0.23
LA 54.94 20.30 581.31 385.07 0.66 0.16
MA 879.38 484.82 12571.94 8350.31 13.11 2.07
MD 227.25 101.67 3157.50 2096.59 9.26 1.88
ME 20.88 17.07 234.31 168.39 0.28 0.11
MI 570.88 392.16 5921.00 4105.80 15.26 2.35
MN 493.13 217.75 8328.81 6168.83 4.40 1.06
MO 159.63 64.73 1166.94 747.70 2.43 0.41
MS 44.56 35.52 568.75 389.86 0.55 0.28
MT 17.50 9.83 264.75 204.21 0.18 0.06
NC 253.38 117.42 3240.00 2105.77 4.79 1.23
ND 11.19 6.52 111.38 80.54 0.20 0.12
NE 44.50 26.69 461.00 307.82 0.48 0.16
NH 114.38 66.78 1651.31 1131.31 1.11 0.46
NJ 675.81 256.10 8374.38 5269.52 11.59 1.18
NM 81.31 127.41 741.75 530.30 3.75 0.74
NV 247.44 226.62 2603.81 2202.51 0.46 0.14
NY 1037.44 411.97 13271.06 8551.06 12.86 0.89
OH 468.69 190.46 5107.56 3354.64 7.39 0.65
OK 54.56 29.19 870.75 563.34 0.67 0.10
OR 166.69 149.52 3353.69 2167.58 2.14 1.00
PA 551.06 213.11 6134.31 3904.21 9.58 0.92
RI 54.25 27.68 590.50 405.54 1.35 0.48
SC 67.13 36.01 704.50 467.85 1.22 0.37
SD 8.69 6.42 83.25 53.83 0.09 0.04
TN 162.44 74.06 1722.69 1199.70 2.18 0.57
TX 764.44 374.16 10631.50 6652.04 11.39 2.42
UT 130.38 64.14 2050.81 1467.04 1.34 0.29
VA 285.19 105.27 3088.69 2160.63 5.35 1.60
VT 13.44 8.92 310.50 175.95 0.39 0.08
WA 335.06 170.85 7067.44 5581.80 8.67 2.01
WI 195.69 84.22 2144.50 1467.90 2.77 0.54
WV 9.81 6.65 125.94 100.74 0.44 0.07
WY 11.50 6.44 94.25 63.34 0.08 0.02
First column is states’ two-letter abbreviation; Traded Patents (of all types of patent flows) and Citations are occur-
rences; R&D activity is R&D spending (in billions of 2000 US dollars).
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Table A.2: Indices of Concentration per State
State Chemical Computers Drugs Electronics Mechanical Others HHI HHI1995−2002 HHI2002−2010
LQ
AK 0.600 0.363 0.570 0.415 1.497 1.946 0.372 0.384 0.360
AL 0.989 0.742 1.037 0.649 1.286 1.260 0.219 0.226 0.211
AR 0.860 0.224 1.022 0.409 1.630 1.726 0.307 0.320 0.294
AZ 0.612 1.278 0.448 1.708 1.049 0.785 0.219 0.207 0.230
CA 0.705 1.391 1.114 1.206 0.635 0.816 0.213 0.194 0.231
CO 0.765 1.551 0.718 1.050 0.792 0.883 0.222 0.206 0.238
CT 1.370 0.616 1.301 1.017 1.207 0.964 0.183 0.187 0.178
DC 0.942 1.330 1.880 0.500 0.622 0.828 0.241 0.222 0.261
DE 4.101 0.176 1.605 0.359 0.709 0.728 0.285 0.322 0.247
FL 0.733 0.802 0.980 0.763 1.079 1.398 0.234 0.234 0.233
GA 1.040 0.948 0.804 0.552 0.993 1.327 0.242 0.247 0.237
HI 0.745 0.510 1.331 0.462 1.036 1.611 0.286 0.314 0.258
IA 0.698 0.629 1.831 0.594 1.417 1.169 0.216 0.221 0.212
ID 0.700 1.137 0.130 2.942 0.750 0.384 0.316 0.293 0.339
IL 1.027 0.814 0.687 0.790 1.210 1.319 0.223 0.221 0.224
IN 0.934 0.364 1.384 0.963 1.585 1.147 0.206 0.206 0.206
KS 0.834 0.882 0.724 0.469 1.148 1.430 0.268 0.279 0.258
KY 1.184 0.714 0.715 0.746 1.402 1.234 0.220 0.233 0.207
LA 1.838 0.203 0.887 0.343 1.301 1.597 0.283 0.276 0.290
MA 1.086 1.146 1.820 0.986 0.642 0.701 0.191 0.182 0.200
MD 1.204 0.924 2.220 0.677 0.815 0.774 0.193 0.194 0.192
ME 0.912 0.545 0.885 0.972 1.393 1.292 0.230 0.252 0.209
MI 0.874 0.436 0.470 0.837 2.873 1.000 0.237 0.236 0.238
MN 1.037 0.885 1.768 0.712 0.941 0.965 0.194 0.198 0.190
MO 1.196 0.384 1.449 0.576 1.274 1.343 0.228 0.236 0.220
MS 1.171 0.376 1.056 0.741 1.167 1.527 0.261 0.281 0.240
MT 1.622 0.280 0.926 0.402 1.382 1.523 0.271 0.281 0.260
NC 0.919 1.084 0.941 0.817 0.845 1.131 0.220 0.217 0.223
ND 0.748 0.396 0.507 0.441 2.572 1.389 0.289 0.317 0.260
NE 0.938 0.411 1.228 0.643 1.450 1.396 0.238 0.244 0.233
NH 0.695 1.093 0.719 1.170 1.279 0.927 0.205 0.194 0.215
NJ 1.510 1.193 1.475 0.641 0.637 0.845 0.198 0.187 0.208
NM 1.647 0.819 0.633 1.690 0.952 0.718 0.197 0.199 0.194
NV 0.532 0.414 0.469 0.655 0.958 2.058 0.372 0.341 0.403
NY 1.192 0.991 0.754 1.243 0.914 0.941 0.194 0.186 0.203
OH 1.522 0.297 0.803 0.705 1.551 1.365 0.235 0.236 0.233
OK 1.868 0.431 0.628 0.393 1.145 1.579 0.273 0.257 0.289
OR 0.507 1.467 0.373 1.233 0.904 1.023 0.242 0.237 0.246
PA 1.659 0.502 1.416 0.924 1.026 0.998 0.188 0.192 0.185
RI 0.904 0.651 0.639 0.821 1.115 1.538 0.259 0.238 0.279
SC 1.509 0.291 0.436 0.689 1.414 1.606 0.279 0.295 0.262
SD 0.487 0.585 0.589 0.687 1.826 1.516 0.282 0.303 0.260
TN 1.388 0.317 1.248 0.750 1.196 1.343 0.228 0.234 0.221
TX 0.955 1.483 0.525 1.200 0.649 0.906 0.224 0.207 0.241
UT 0.855 0.758 1.426 0.612 1.420 1.122 0.204 0.198 0.210
VA 1.006 1.034 0.714 0.872 1.239 1.055 0.207 0.205 0.209
VT 0.475 1.018 0.284 2.848 0.598 0.605 0.303 0.265 0.342
WA 0.579 1.443 0.927 0.689 0.889 1.010 0.246 0.206 0.286
WI 1.035 0.286 1.015 0.907 1.468 1.394 0.236 0.239 0.234
WV 3.208 0.212 0.519 0.442 1.291 1.163 0.270 0.291 0.249
WY 1.202 0.244 0.833 0.519 1.551 1.626 0.299 0.351 0.247
First column is states’ two-letter abbreviation; LQ: Location Quotient; HHI: Hirshman-Herfindhal Index.
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